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Approved For Release 2001/05/23 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100100001-4

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

CIA/BI GM 66-2
September 1965

KASHMIR



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF BASIC INTELLIGENCE

25X1C

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GROUP 1
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AND DECLASSIFICATION

KASHMIR

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
The cease-fire line (CFL) extends from the Punjab plains on the south to the glaciers of the Karakoram Range on the north and thus crosses all of the major physical regions of Kashmir. These regions resemble a series of ascending south-to-north steps, culminating in the 25,000-foot Karakoram peaks. The southern sector of the CFL extends northward from the Punjab to Uri, a town in the Jhelum Valley, and passes through relatively low hills and mountains. The northeastern sector crosses much higher terrain that is mostly barren, desolate, and largely uninhabited.

[illegible]

From the Northern edge of the plains the CPT extends northwest for about 30 miles, paralleling the scrub-clad, northward-facing, steep, ridged ridges of the Siwalik Range. These ridges are some 3,000 to 4,000 feet high, and rise 100 to 200 feet above the main valley floors; they are steep-sided and difficult to traverse. The main line of the CPT runs from Akbar parallel to the CPT and near Nausahbahr is only 10 to 15 miles or so from the CPT. The CPT runs northward from the Basse River, from there it winds in a CPT. It turns northeast and follows the Salween into Indian-held territory at Rajahmundry. The terrain of the CPT is very rough, with many steep hills and gullies. The CPT consists of approximately 40 miles of very rough hill and valley country. Although the CPT is generally very rough, it is not fairly densely populated and, locally poor, in fact mostly barren, the area is mostly flatlands or straggling up the sides of the less steep slopes. The CPT is a difficult climb over numerous small hills and valleys, there are a few, and the road probably is usable only in fair weather. The CPT and Rajahmundry are the only two places where the CPT runs into the Poonch area. The most difficult cut section is between Mirpur and Rajahmundry where the CPT runs up the steep ridges of the Siwalik Range. A road leads west from the Puncu to the steep ridges of the Siwalik Range. A road

Northeast of Punch the CFL enters the Pir Panjal Range, which marks the western rim of the Vale of Kashmir. Peaks of the Panjal rise to elevations of 12,000 to 14,500 feet and many slopes high as 11,000 feet are covered with coniferous forests, giving a general appearance strongly suggestive of the American Rockies.

et of Gulmarg the CFL follows the crest of the Pir Panjal for a



few miles and then turns west, paralleling the Jhelum Valley. Although the Pir Panjal and its associated ranges on the northwest flank constitute a barrier to movement into the fertile Vale, a barrier broken only by the deep gulches of the summer and early cattle tracks and footpaths lead from the northern Kashmir across the mountains and into the Vale. Throughout the mountainous and forested areas, mountain forests and alpine pastures are extensively grazed by large numbers of sheep, goats, and cattle brought up by herders from the plains and lowlands. The Jhelum Valley, at an elevation of 4,000 to 5,000 feet, is the main approach to the Vale, however, and the recent Indian seizure of the Haveli Pass (elevation 8,650 feet) south of Uri was intended to prevent infiltrators based in the Poonch salient from using the Jhelum route.

Northeastern Sector: Near Uri, the CFL parallels the Jhelum River for a few miles and then turns northward to the Kishanganga River at Tithwal. From this point to Kanazawl, the line generally is a few miles east of and 4,000 to 5,000 feet higher than the Pakistan-held Kishanganga Valley, though the two valleys are close together. River itself for short distances. The terrain is similar, with the Pir Panjal Range country, with deeply entrenched river valleys, large areas of coniferous forest, and barren, rocky peaks and ridges. Elevations to 14,000 feet in elevation. Settlements are few, largely confined to river lowlands and occasional slopes below 7,000 or 8,000 feet.

Indian outposts north of the Jhelum Valley are supplied via a network of motorable routes leading from Srinagar to the Northern part of the Valley. In contrast, Pakistani posts are served from Misafarahbad by two narrow roads that follow the steep slopes of the Jhelum and Kishanganga Valleys. Both roads are damaged frequently and blocked by slides during the summer monsoon.

North of Kamsalwan the CFL crosses the upper Kishanganga Valley and ascends spurs of the Great Himalaya Range. For the remaining 175 miles to the Karakoram glaciers the line generally follows high peaks and ridges, most of which are snow covered. Elevations averaging between 12,000 and 17,000 feet. The typical Kishanganga Valley evergreen-clad slopes extend to the north and northwest-southeast aligned Great Himalaya Range. Farther east, however, the terrain is mostly barren and the country is sparsely inhabited. Vegetation is limited mainly to scrub and forested areas near villages. The few settlements are small and are generally located in the valleys.

make a living. Pakistani posts are few in this sector and probably occupied only seasonally. Access to the CFL is mainly via animal tracks along river valleys. A jeep road from Abbottabad north to Chilas is open for a few months during summer; other seasons

Most of the area south of the CFL in Indian-controlled territory is administratively part of Ladakh. This area is probably even higher on the average than northwestern Kashmir and is more sparsely inhabited, but in the very high mountains of the eastern part is some fairly broad, open valleys and very high, rolling, desolate plains.

The Indian posts are supplied by the important Srinagar - Leh road, which also serves Indian forces opposing the Chinese along the Ladakh border. From Dras to Kargil, however, this road closely approaches Pakistani territory, and at Kargil the Pakistani posts are only 3 miles from the road and overlook it from high ground. Pakistani raids against the road earlier this year led to Indian occupation of these posts; a later Indian withdrawal was followed by reoccupation during the present crisis.

CLIMATE

The climate of the southern sector of the CFL resembles that of the north Indian plains, with modifications induced by elevation. The summer monsoon normally commences in early July to early September. It is accompanied by considerable cloudiness and rain. It falls to 15 inches during July and about the same during August. Precipitation increases with elevation. The Vale, however, is shielded by the mountains from the monsoon, and receives only 10 inches of rain to 4 inches each month. The monsoon rains in northern India are strong and continuing, and very considerably. After the retreat of the monsoon line, with many clear days and little or no rain, the weather is generally pleasant. The temperature is moderate, and the humidity is not so oppressive as in cooler weather, either ground or air military operations. The weather is generally clear, with occasional showers. In the Punjab plains to the south, winter conditions resemble those in Kashmir and Ladakh, with generally good weather, about 2 inches of rain each month.

mid-March, with depths occasionally up to a foot. Spring snows are not infrequent and may temporarily block routes out of the Valley until early May.

The summer monsoon seldom reaches beyond the Great Himal Range north and east of the Vale. In the deep valleys of the Indus its tributaries, a desertlike environment is encountered and yearly precipitation is a mere 5 to 8 inches. Precipitation, mostly snow, is greater on the high slopes and in the mountains, and trails and passes are periodically closed. Strong, biting winds and subfreezing, occasionally subzero, temperatures intensify the discomfort.

The traditional lines of communication between the plains and the Vale of Kashmir were altered by the establishment of the cease-fire line. Because the main Jhelum Valley access route to the cease-fire line is the Jhelum River, the Indian Government has been able to exploit an existing road that led northwards quickly improved and rebuilt sections of many miles of hills and mountains. The road is open to traffic across the mountainous terrain because of a tunnel through the Pir Panjal Range, although subject to occasional closures because of snow and winter snows. The entire Indian position along the CFL is a narrow strip of land as close to Pakistan as the CFL, and the main Indian supply route is this route, from Kathua to Akhnur, as well as the eastern section of the Jhelum River. It is similarly threatened by its nearness to the West Pakistan Punjab border. The Indian position along the CFL is to the northeast, however, and the main Indian supply route is the Jhelum River. The Indian network of roads and tracks radiating from the major supply route is shown in Figure 1.

Pakistani and Azad Kashmiri forces south of the Jhelum are supplied by roads from Rawalpindi and Jhelum via Muzre and Mirpur respectively. North of the Jhelum, however, roads are few and are difficult to maintain. East of the Kanskiwan, Pakistani posts along the CFI are supplied by long and circuitous routes that require animal transport in some places.

[illegible]

Area and Population of Kashmir a/		
	Area (in square miles)	Population
Territory controlled by India		
Anantnag	2,097	694,358
Baramulla	2,536	604,699
Doda	1,380	459,449
Jammu	1,249	2,156,232
Kathua	277	277,499
Ladakh	37,774	88,562
Poonch	1,589	366,062
Srinagar	1,205	640,441
Udhampur	1,713	429,042
	33,669	3,860,977
Territory controlled by Pakistan		
East Faisal Gilgit Agency	4,500	1,000,000
	47,500	150,000
	31,500	1,160,000
Total	89,165	4,790,977

a. Area and population statistics for Indian-controlled Kashmir are taken from the 1961 census; statistics for Pakistani-controlled Kashmir are based on recent estimates.

The locational significance of the Indian line of communication border in southern Kashmir is their close proximity to the West Pakistan border. From Pambankot, the Indian line of communication border lies 10 miles or less across open plains from the Pakistan border. In contrast, Pakistan supply lines to the CPL are protected by a combination of their distance from Indian-held territory and an alignment of roads across rough terrain that would make the Kashmiri boundary difficult. The vast north Indian plains adjacent to both Pakistan and farther east in India contain good road and rail networks. Movement of men and vehicles would be relatively easy, although several major rivers would have to be aligned rivers and a fairly dense network of canals present local agricultural

To Pakistan, Kashmir is more than a territorial issue. The continued existence of a divided Kashmir has become a symbol of Indian aggressiveness and Pakistani inability to cope with Indian power. Frustrations have increased in recent years. India refuses to discuss Kashmir, measures have been taken recently to tighten the control of the Indian Government over India, and since late 1962 Indian military strength has been increased. It is aided in part by equipment and training supplied by the West. It is within this framework that Pakistan organised and directed the present paramilitary operation against the Indian-held Kashmir. The objectives were to spark a Muslim revolt and generate international pressures enough to force a Kashmir settlement.

For India, in contrast, Kashmir has been but one of many foreign policy problems. The status quo is more palatable to India, since it is in control of the most important and productive areas, and a solution that does not allow Indian control of the Vale of Kashmir appears to be unacceptable. This position has been reinforced in recent years by the border conflict between India and China, as the only ground route to supply Indian forces in eastern Ladakh runs through the Vale. An alternate route via the Kulu Valley to the India is now under construction, but its completion probably is years away.

A settlement of the Kashmir dispute is the key to peace in the subcontinent, but after 18 years a means of settling the dispute appears to be more remote than ever.

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TITLE OF REPORT KASHMIR				DATE 17 September 1965
REPORT NO. GM 66-2	PROJECT NO. 61.2268	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	CONTROL	
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COPY NO.	RECIPIENT			DATE SENT
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	1 - GD/F			
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	1 - Editing			
STATINTL	1 - [REDACTED] (for Task Force per RTA's request)			
	[REDACTED] 36-35			25 Sep 65
STATINTL	[REDACTED]			27 Sep
	[REDACTED]			25 Sep
	[REDACTED] 1-E 32			27 Sep
	[REDACTED]			29 Sep
	[REDACTED]			7 Oct 65
	1 Circulated to GD			14 Oct 65
STATINTL	[REDACTED] 6611 OCT (unrequested)			22 Oct 65
	1 D/OBI (G)			
	1 Col White, 42nd Plan/Program, Budget			25 Feb 66
STATINTL	[REDACTED] ED/BI 2 Returned 12 Sept 66			29 Aug 66

STATINTL

Office of Planning, Programming & Budgeting
MEMORANDUM FOR:

[REDACTED]

+ 7804

6-E-08 Hyster.

*would like a copy of a
report that we did recently ~~at~~
that had distribution outside of
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FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

Rec'd 25 Feb 66

PN 61.2268

GM 66-2

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May

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
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Dissemination Control Branch, DD/CR

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Special Assistant
Director of Basic Intelligence

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Project No. 61,228 Approved For Release 2001/05/23 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100100001-4

GM 66-2

Report No.

Project Self-initiated
Date Released 8 Sept '65
Classification SECRET
8 Sept 65
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ANALYST [REDACTED] 9 Sep
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Distributions for Final Editing

For Final Edit ✓
For Distribution
For Distro
To be sent with carbons
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Maps

Compilation Branch
Map Number Subteen
None

Other Comments and Remarks

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no lino type

Final Editorial Approval
Before Reproduction and
Distribution

All changes on Final Copy ANMA 13 Sep

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SECRET

REQUEST FOR PROJECT APPROVAL

TO :	CHIEF, GEOGRAPHIC RESEARCH, OBI ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OBI DIRECTOR OF BASIC INTELLIGENCE	DATE
		31 August 1965
FROM :	CHIEF, GEOGRAPHY DIVISION, OBI OBI	
SUBJECT:	REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF PROJECT NUMBER 61.2268	
1. SUBJECT OF PROPOSED PROJECT		
Kashmir		
2. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM To prepare an Intelligence Memorandum that will revise and update CIA/RR GM-2, <u>The Kashmir Question</u> , dated December 1956. The revision envisages a complete reorientation with a focus upon the environmental characteristics of the Cease Fire Line (CFL) area, routes leading to the CFL, the relationship of the CFL and Indian problems of securing their frontier in eastern Ladakh, and the strategic importance of the Vale of Kashmir. The problem will be viewed in the context of past and recent *		
3. NAME OF REQUESTER	25X1A	4. RESPONSIBLE OFFICER ANALYST
Self-initiated		5. BRANCH GD/F
6. COORDINATION REQUESTED FROM (Specify)		
OBI		
A. OTHER CIA DIVISIONS	Preparation of map by Cartography Division	
B. OTHER CIA COMPONENTS	OCI, ONE	
C. OUTSIDE CIA	Possibly State and DIA	
7. ESTIMATED MAN-HOURS IN XXXX GD:	8. TARGET DATE FOR ISSUANCE	
120	October 1965	
9. TYPE OF XXXX PUBLICATION		
CIA/BI GM		
10. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DISTRIBUTION OF FINISHED REPORT		
Standard for GM		
11. REMARKS: If developments prior to the completion of the GM deflate the immediate intelligence importance of Kashmir, it is proposed to reorient the GM to treat all of the Indian-Pakistan border problems. Such complete coverage will, otherwise, be produced in a succeeding GM.		
* Indian-Pakistani relations, and brief but pertinent background material will be included.		
25X1A	25X1A	
APPROVED:		
	DATE 1 Sept 1965	
DIRECTOR OF BASIC INTELLIGENCE		
DATE		
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OBI		
Approved For Release 2001/05/23 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000400100001-4		

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification**SECRET**

1 September 1965

X

Jammu and Kashmir

Unclassified

61.2268

STATINTL

Self-initiated

 CD/F

6903

One map of Kashmir plus insets on 1) enlargement of south end of Cease Fire Line (CFL); 2) enlargement of CFL near Kangil; and 3) administrative divisions and population distribution.

1 September 1965


STATINTL

GEOGRAPHY DIVISION REQUEST FOR GRAPHICS

TO: CHIEF, CARTOGRAPHY DIVISION

1 September 1965
Date

Check whether SENSITIVE

Yes

X
No

Sanitized Title if above is Yes: _____

Actual Title: Jammu and Kashmir

Map No. _____

Classification: Unclassified Control: _____

Date Graphics Required: _____ Number of Copies: _____

GD Project No.: 61.2268 GD's Requester: Self-initiated

GD Analyst and Branch: [REDACTED] GD/Y STATINTL Phone No.: 6903

Remarks: One map of Kashmir plus insets on 1) enlargement of south
end of Cease Fire Line (CFL); 2) enlargement of CFL near Kangil; and
3) administrative divisions and population distribution.

Date Approved: 1 September 1965 STATINTL [REDACTED]

SA/Ch/GD/BI

Instructions: To be made up in triplicate: Two copies to CD/BI, one of which will be returned to OCh/GD with map number. The third copy to be held in OCh/GD until the second is returned; the third copy with map number added to be sent to the GD Branch requesting graphics.

GROUP I

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REQUEST FOR PROJECT APPROVAL

TO :	CHIEF, GEOGRAPHIC RESEARCH, ORR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, ORR DIRECTOR OF BASIC INTELLIGENCE	DATE 31 August 1965
FROM :	CHIEF, GEOGRAPHY DIVISION, OBI	
SUBJECT:	REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF PROJECT NUMBER 61.2268	
1. SUBJECT OF PROPOSED PROJECT Kashmir		
2. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM To prepare an Intelligence Memorandum that will revise and update CIA/RR GM-2, The Kashmir Question, dated December 1956. The revision envisages a complete reorientation with a focus upon the environmental characteristics of the Cease Fire Line (CFL) area, routes leading to the CFL, the relationship of the CFL and Indian problems of securing their frontier in eastern Ladakh, and the strategic importance of the Vale of Kashmir. The problem will be viewed in the context of *		
3. NAME OF REQUESTER Self-initiated	4. RESPONSIBLE D/GG ANALYST STATINTL [REDACTED] GR/Rx	5. BRANCH GD/F
6. COORDINATION REQUESTED FROM (Specify)		
A. OTHER GRA DIVISIONS Preparation of map by Cartography Division		
B. OTHER CIA COMPONENTS OCI, ONE		
C. OUTSIDE CIA Possibly State and DIA		
7. ESTIMATED MAN-HOURS 120 in GD:	8. TARGET DATE FOR ISSUANCE October 65	
9. TYPE OF GM PUBLICATION CIA/BI GM		
10. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DISTRIBUTION OF FINISHED REPORT Standard for GM		
11. Remarks: If developments prior to the completion of the GM reduce significantly the intelligence importance of Kashmir, it is proposed to include this material in an expanded GM that will treat all of the Indian-Pakistan border problems. Such <i>deflate the immediate</i> <i>to</i> <i>complete coverage will, otherwise, be produced in a succeeding GM.</i>		
APPROVED <i>(signature)</i> DATE _____ DIRECTOR OF BASIC INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, ORR		

REQUEST FOR PROJECT APPROVAL

TO :	CHIEF, GEOGRAPHIC RESEARCH, ORR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, ORR	DATE 31 Aug 1965
FROM :	CHIEF, GEOGRAPHY DIVISION, ORR	
SUBJECT:	REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF PROJECT NUMBER 61.2268	

1. SUBJECT OF PROPOSED PROJECT Kashmir		
2. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM To prepare a Geographic Intelligence memorandum that will revise and update GM 2, The Kashmir Question, dated December 1956. The revision envisages a complete reorientation with a focus upon the environmental characteristics of the cease fire line, logistical routes supporting Indian and Pakistani positions, the relationship of the main Indian supply route to Lashkar with the cease fire line, and the importance and value of the role. See attached.		
3. NAME OF REQUESTER Self-initiated	25X1A	4. RESPONSIBLE D/GG ANALYST [REDACTED]
5. BRANCH GD/F		
6. COORDINATION REQUESTED FROM (Specify)		
A. OTHER GRA DIVISIONS Preparation of maps by Cartography		
B. OTHER CIA COMPONENTS OCI, ONE.		
C. OUTSIDE CIA Possibly State and DIA.		
7. ESTIMATED MAN-HOURS IN D/GG 120	8. TARGET DATE FOR ISSUANCE end of September 77	
9. TYPE OF D/GG PUBLICATION GM		
10. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DISTRIBUTION OF FINISHED REPORT Standard GM distribution		
11. REMARKS: If developments prior to the completion of the GM reduce significantly the intelligence importance of Kashmir, it is proposed to include this material in an expanded GM that will treat all of the Indian-Pakistan border problems.		

APPROVED:

_____ CHIEF, GEOGRAPHIC RESEARCH	_____ DATE
_____ ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, ORR	_____ DATE

2.

To prepare a Geographic Intelligence Memorandum that will ~~xx~~ revise and update GM#2, The Kashmir Question, dated December 1956. The revision envisages a complete reorientation with a focus upon the environmental characteristics of the Cease Fire Line ^(CFL) area, routes leading to the CFL, the relationship of the CFL and ~~the~~ Indian ~~security~~ problems of securing their frontier in eastern Ladakh, and the strategic importance of the Vale of Kashmir. The problem will be ~~briefly~~ viewed in the context of past and recent Indian-Pakistan~~n~~ relations, and brief but pertinent background material will be included.

BRANCH CHIEFS ROUTING SLIP
Date

DATA	_____	_____
DATA	_____	_____
DATA	_____	_____
JEG	<u>9</u>	<u>15 Oct 65</u>
ABE	<u>11</u>	<u>21 Oct 65</u>
ED	<u>BS</u>	<u>20 Oct 65</u>
DATA	_____	_____
JAB	<u>12</u>	<u>8 Nov</u>
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File
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